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LAW, AUTONOMY AND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
 




At common law, advance directives regarding medical treatment are underpinned by the principle 
of autonomy.  An advance directive provides a means by which a competent adult can determine 
the medical treatment that he or she wants to accept or refuse in the future if his or her decision-
making competence is lost.1  While there are some conditions that need to be satisfied before a 
directive will be followed, for the most part, the common law requires a person’s refusal of 
treatment as expressed in an advance directive to be followed, even if it is unpopular with an 
individual’s family or friends, or is contrary to objective notions of good medical practice.  In this 
way, the common law recognises autonomous choices about medical treatment made by a 
competent person. This right to refuse treatment has also been enshrined in statute.  Legislation in 
most Australian jurisdictions permit a person with capacity to make an advance directive that 
refuses treatment.2  In recognising this common law right, the statutes too are then, at least 
implicitly, underpinned by autonomy. 
 
This article considers whether the current reliance on autonomy by the law to recognise advance 
directives is appropriate.  We begin by outlining, in Section II of the article, the common law that 
governs advance directives and, in Section III, we discuss the relevant Australian legislation that 
facilitate the making giving of such directives.  In both sections, we examine the role that the 
principle of autonomy has played in recognising advance directives. 
 
We then turn to consider whether autonomy can be justified as an appropriate normative 
framework. Section IV of the article examines the value accorded to this principle from three 
different perspectives, all of them being relevant to the context of advance directives.  They range 
from broader perspectives that consider the role of regulation generally, through to a more specific 
examination of analogous situations.  
 
Starting with the general, the first perspective considered is the value placed on autonomy in a 
liberal democracy.  Most Western societies are liberal democracies and so regulation of human 
conduct, including the making and recognition of advance directives, should be consistent with 
theories of how such a society should function.  Autonomy plays a significant role in these theories 
and so adds weight to the argument that the law should recognise a competent adult’s ability to 
refuse treatment in advance.  One legal field that is becoming increasingly significant in liberal 
democracies is human rights.  Unsurprisingly, human rights law places great weight on autonomy 
generally and some human rights legislation and instruments even expressly recognise the 
importance of autonomy in the context of refusing medical treatment.  
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1 This article only considers autonomy in the context of advance directives that refuse medical treatment. Advance 
directives that request treatment have not been recognised at law as involving a binding exercise of a person’s 
autonomy: R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2006] QB 273. 
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The second perspective is that of medical ethics.  Medical ethics and law are different disciplines,3 
but there is an overlap and relationship between them so that the primacy given to autonomy in 
medical ethics adds weight to the use of autonomy in recognising advance directives as a matter of 
law. The third perspective is the closely analogous situation of refusals of life-sustaining treatment 
that are made contemporaneously.  The very clear acceptance by the case law of autonomy in this 
context supports its acceptance in the case of refusals in advance. 
 
In seeking to justify the current recognition of autonomy by the law governing advance directives, 
Section V of the article engages with the arguments as to why autonomy is not the appropriate 
framework to underpin advance directives.  Firstly, global or philosophical objections to the 
appropriateness of autonomy in this context are considered.  Secondly, concerns about the practical 
application of autonomy to advance directives are explored.  As part of this examination, the merits 
of those arguments are critiqued and counter arguments raised. 
 
Finally, we raise briefly a number of preliminary points concerning the scope of this article.  The 
first relates to the meaning that we attribute to autonomy.  There are many differing views about 
what is meant by the principle of autonomy,4 and it is beyond the scope of this article to engage in 
this debate.  However, for the purpose of this article, Raanan Gillon’s definition of autonomy 
provides a helpful focus and encapsulates the principle of autonomy that is appropriate for our 
purposes:  
 
“Autonomy (literally, self rule) is, in summary, the capacity to think, decide and act on the 
basis of such thought and decision freely and independently and without … hindrance.”5 
 
The second point to note is what is not considered in this article, and that is whether the law’s 
acceptance of the principle of autonomy is in fact reflected in the outcomes of judicially decided 
cases.  While this is a related and significant issue,6 the purpose of this article instead is to argue 
that the law’s recognition that the principle of autonomy underpins advance directives is 
appropriate.   
 
II. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND AUTONOMY AT COMMON LAW 
 
                                                 
3 I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law, 3rd ed (London: Butterworths, 2000) 4. 
4 This is noted by TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 99. 
5 R Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics (1992) extracted in SL Lowe, “Autonomous Agency and Consent in the Treatment 
of the Terminally Ill” in AH Maehle and J Geyer-Kordesch (eds), Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Biomedical 
Ethics: From Paternalism to Autonomy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) 130.  For other formulations and observations about the 
meaning of autonomy see J Coggon, “Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable 
Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism?” (2007) 15 Health Care Anal 235; G Laurie, “The Autonomy of Others: Reflections 
on the Rise and Rise of Patient Choice in Contemporary Medical Law” in S McLean (ed) First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics 
and Healthcare (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) chap 9; G Winzelberg, L Hanson and J Tulsky, “Beyond Autonomy: 
Diversifying End-of-Life Decision-Making Approaches to Serve Patients and Families” (2005) 53 Journal of American 
Geriatrics Society 1046; Beauchamp and Childress, n 4 at 99-102; JF Childress, “The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics” 
(1990) 20(1) The Hastings Center Report 12. 
6 Indeed, this point has received significant scrutiny over recent years.  See, for example, S Michalowski, “Advance 
Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of an Absolute Right” (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 
958, A Maclean, “Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-Making” (2008) 16 Medical Law 
Review 1 and L Willmott, ‘Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of Autonomy: Do the Courts 
Practise What They Preach?’ (2009) 38(4) Common Law World Review 295.   
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At common law, an advance directive that is valid and applicable to the relevant circumstances is 
legally binding7 and a doctor who does not follow it may be liable to both civil and criminal 
sanctions.8 In Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent), Hughes J stated:9 
 
It is … clearly the law that the doctors are not entitled so to act [provide treatment] if it is known that the 
patient, provided he was of sound mind and full capacity, has let it be known that he does not consent and that 
such treatment is against his wishes. To this extent an advance indication of the wishes of a patient of full 
capacity and sound mind are effective. 
 
This section of the article outlines the common law that governs advance directives.  It begins by 
examining the two conditions for an advance directive to be binding: that the directive is valid and 
applicable to the situation that has arisen.  It then considers the legal authority for the proposition 
that autonomy underpins the law’s recognition of advance directives. 
 
A. Validity of advance directives 
 
An advance directive will be valid at common law if two conditions are met.  The first condition is 
that the person must be competent at the time the directive is given. A person will be competent if 
he or she has the necessary capacity to make the directive and is then able to communicate that 
decision.10  For a person to have capacity, he or she must have “…the ability, whether or not one 
chooses to use it, to function rationally: having the ability to understand, retain, believe and evaluate 
(ie, process) and weigh the information which is relevant to the subject matter.”11 
 
At common law, a person is presumed to have capacity to make a directive, so the onus of proving 
that there was a lack of capacity is on the person alleging it.12  The level of capacity needed to give 
an advance directive will depend on the nature of the decision being made.  A decision with grave 
consequences, such as refusing life-sustaining treatment, will require a higher the level of capacity 
than other decisions.13 
 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord 
Goff); Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 103 (Lord Donaldson MR); Re C [1994] 1 WLR 290, 294-
295 (Thorpe J); HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, 114-5 (Munby J); W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2005] 
1 WLR 834, [15] (Brooke LJ); Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, [40] 
(McDougall J). 
8 See, for example, Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, 73 (Lord Goff); Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 117 
(Butler-Sloss LJ) and Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 866 (Lord Goff); Hunter and New England Area 
Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, [40] (McDougall J).  For a discussion of the damages available when there is 
a failure to follow an advance directive, see S Michalowski, “Trial and Error at the End of Life – No Harm Done?” 
(2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 257. 
9 [2001] FLR 129, 134. 
10 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] QB 424, 440 (Munby J) (although note that, in overturning the decision, 
the Court of Appeal suggested caution in relying on aspects of Munby J’s judgment in future cases: R (Burke) v General 
Medical Council [2006] QB 273, 295 (Lord Phillips MR, Waller and Wall LJJ)).   
11 Ibid. 
12 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, 414–415 (Munby J); Re C [1994] 1 WLR 290, 294 (Thorpe J); 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff), 892 (Lord Mustill); Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 
[1993] Fam 95, 115 (Lord Donaldson MR); Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, 
[23] (McDougall J). 
13 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449, 472 (Butler-Sloss P); Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 113 (Lord Donaldson MR). For commentary about whether the high standard of capacity 
required in this context is consistent with notions of autonomy, see J Manning, “Autonomy and the Competent Patient’s 
Right to Refuse Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment — Again” (2002) 10 Journal of Law and Medicine 239. See also M 
Parker, “Judging Capacity: Paternalism and the Risk-Related Standard” (2004) 11 Journal of Law and Medicine 482, 
where he argues that there should be just the one standard for assessment of capacity, not a standard that alters with the 
gravity of the decision. He further argues that the latter ‘risk-related’ assessment of capacity is paternalistic in that it 
imports medical values into determination of capacity: 489−490. 
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The second condition is that the person was free of undue influence at the time the directive was 
made.14  Not all influence will be regarded as undue.  Provided the decision remains that of the 
person, it is legitimate for others, such as family, friends and doctors, to provide advice and even 
seek to persuade the person to change his or her mind.15 
 
It has been suggested that a third requirement must also be met before an advance directive can 
operate: a person must have been given sufficient information to found making a decision.16  While 
it is clearly desirable that decisions about medical treatment should be informed ones, the authors 
suggest that this requirement should not be part of the common law.17 Of significance is the often 
quoted passage from Lord Donaldson MR in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment):18 
 
An adult patient who … suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to choose whether to consent 
to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered … This 
right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as sensible.  It exists notwithstanding that 
the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent. 
 
These fundamental principles have been recognised across Western jurisdictions: in the United 
States Supreme Court, Cardozo J famously declared that ‘[e]very human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault’.19 To require as a matter of 
law that a person be provided with information before making a decision (whether 
contemporaneous or in advance) is inconsistent with this fundamental principle.20  It would permit, 
for example, the assault of a person to provide medical treatment against their wishes if he or she 
refused to hear information about prognosis.  Accordingly, while informed decision-making is 
preferable, we argue that the common law does not require a person to have received relevant 
information before an advance directive can be binding.21  This view has now been accepted in 
Australia in the recent decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court.22 
 
Finally, there are no formality requirements for an advance directive to be valid, although a lack of 
formality may be relevant when seeking to establish the existence and scope of an advance 
directive.23  A directive is capable of being revoked by the person at any time they have the 
competence to do so.24 
 
                                                 
14 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 121 (Staughton LJ); Hunter and New England Area Health 
Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, [26] (McDougall J).  
15 In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) where the English Court of Appeal found that a woman’s refusal of treatment 
was not binding on the treating team, Staughton LJ considered that influence will be undue only if there is ‘such a 
degree of external influence as to persuade the patient to depart from her own wishes’: [1993] Fam 95, 121. 
16 Kennedy and Grubb, n 3 at 2037–2038. 
17 See Willmott, L Willmott, B White and M Howard, “Refusing Advance Refusals: Advance Directives and Life-
Sustaining Medical Treatment” (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 211 at 220-221. 
18 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 102 .  This passage is cited in Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 
2 FLR 426, 432 (Butler-Sloss LJ). See also Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449, 456 
(Butler-Sloss P); Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 115 (Lord Donaldson MR), 116 (Butler-Sloss LJ), 
120-121 (Staughton LJ); Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff), 891 (Lord Mustill); HE v A 
Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, 414; Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385.  
19 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92 (1914), 93. 
20 This point is argued at greater length in Willmott, White and Howard, n 17 at 220-221. 
21 Although whether information was provided may, of course, be relevant to whether a person would have intended 
their directive to operate in the circumstances that have arisen. 
22 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, [28]-[30] (McDougall J). Compare 
Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229, [49] (Martin CJ). 
23 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, 417 (Munby J). 
24 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, 418 (Munby J). 
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B. Applicability of advance directives 
 
In addition to being valid, an advance directive must also be applicable to the circumstances that 
have arisen for it to bind doctors. Applicability turns on whether the directive was intended by the 
person to operate in the relevant circumstances.25  Four categories where a directive may not reveal 
such an intention have been identified from the limited case law.26 
 
The first category is where there has been a change in circumstances since the directive was made 
such that the person would not have intended it to govern the situation.  In HE v A Hospital NHS 
Trust,27 a 24-year-old woman had executed an advance directive refusing blood transfusions or 
other blood products. She had initially been a Muslim but was raised as a Jehovah’s Witness by her 
mother. There was, however, evidence that she had agreed to revert to Islam because she was 
marrying a man of that faith, and that she had implemented that decision by no longer attending 
Jehovah’s Witness meetings and services. In these circumstances, Munby J held that the directive28 
 
cannot have survived her deliberate, implemented, decision to abandon that faith and revert to being a Muslim. 
When the entire substratum has gone, when the very assumption on which the advance directive was based has 
been destroyed by subsequent events then … the refusal ceases to be effective. 
 
The second category is where the terms of an advance directive are uncertain or ambiguous so that 
it cannot be said to apply to the circumstances that have arisen.29  An example commonly cited is 
where a directive refuses ‘heroic measures’ but does not articulate what sort of medical treatment 
that includes.30  An illustration of this category of advance directives not being applicable because 
of uncertainty or ambiguity is the decision of W Healthcare NHS Trust v H.31 This case involved a 
woman with multiple sclerosis who was being provided with artificial nutrition and hydration 
through a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube, which became dislodged.  She had made a 
number of statements many years earlier about her future medical care.  The English Court of 
Appeal accepted that some of her statements may have been sufficient to refuse some medical 
treatment, for example, her desire not to be kept alive on ‘life support machines’.32 However, other 
general statements that she wished to refuse treatment based on quality of life considerations were 
‘not sufficiently clear’ to amount to an advance directive refusing artificial nutrition and 
hydration.33 
 
The third category where an advance directive will not be applicable to the circumstances is where 
it is based on incorrect information or an incorrect assumption.  In Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment),34 both Lord Donaldson MR and Butler-Sloss LJ indicated that a refusal based on an 
incorrect assumption would not be operative.35  They pointed to evidence that the patient, when 
                                                 
25 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] 3 Fam 95, 114 (Lord Donaldson MR). 
26 These categories are discussed in greater detail in L Willmott, B White and M Howard, “Refusing Advance Refusals: 
Advance Directives and Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment” (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 211, 222-
224.  
27 [2003] 2 FLR 408.  
28 Ibid 422. 
29 Michalowski, n 6 at 965–6; C Stewart, “The Australian Experience of Advance Directives and Possible Future 
Directions” (2005) 24 Australasian Journal on Ageing S25, S26. 
30 This term and its vagueness are considered by I Kerridge et al, “Advance Directives” in I Freckelton and K Petersen 
(eds), Controversies in Health Law (Leichhardt: The Federation Press, 1999) 307. 
31 [2005] 1 WLR 834. Compare Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129 where no issue of uncertainty 
arose, no doubt aided by the fact that the statements were given shortly before and in contemplation of the specific 
treatment that was being refused. 
32 [2005] 1 WLR 834, 839 (Brooke LJ). 
33 Ibid 840 (Brooke LJ).   
34 [1993] Fam 95. 
35 Ibid 114 (Lord Donaldson MR), 120 (Butler-Sloss LJ). 
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refusing blood products, was told that other effective alternative treatments were available and that 
a transfusion was not often needed in her circumstances.36  
 
The fourth category where an advance directive does not apply is where it does not make a decision 
about the circumstances that have arisen.  The classic example cited is the American decision of 
Werth v Taylor.37  This case involved a written refusal of blood transfusions two months prior to the 
hospital admission which was reaffirmed verbally on arrival.  The Michigan Court of Appeals 
concluded that because the directive was given at a time when the woman’s life was not in danger, 
she was not regarded as having made a decision to refuse blood transfusions in circumstances where 
her life was actually at risk.38 
 
 
C. Autonomy underpinning legal recognition of advance directives 
 
The law concerning a competent adult’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment highlights 
two important but conflicting principles, both of which are recognised by the common law.  The 
first is that of personal autonomy, which dictates that an individual’s right to self-determination 
demands that he or she is able to refuse treatment, even if this results in the person’s death.  The 
conflicting principle, the sanctity of life, recognises the State’s interest in ensuring the well-being of 
its citizens. 
 
The courts have considered how these conflicting principles should be resolved in the context of 
refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment, and have uniformly concluded that the principle of 
autonomy should prevail over the sanctity of life.  A famous (and frequently cited) pronouncement 
on the resolution of this conflict (albeit in the context of an incompetent adult who had not given an 
advance directive) is by Lord Goff in the landmark decision of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland:39 
 
First, it is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to the wishes 
of the patient, so that if an adult patient of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to treatment 
or care by which his life would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to 
his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do so … To this extent, the 
principle of the sanctity of human life must yield to the principle of self-determination … Moreover the same 
principle applies where the patient’s refusal to give his consent has been expressed at an earlier date, before he 
became unconscious or otherwise incapable of communicating it …  
 
Similar statements were made in the English Court of Appeal in Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment),40 a case in which a woman lost consciousness after purporting to give a 
contemporaneous refusal of blood transfusions.  The woman’s condition deteriorated to the extent 
that she needed to receive a blood transfusion to save her life.  Lord Donaldson MR commented on 
the conflict of principles in the following way:41 
 
The situation gives rise to a conflict between two interests, that of the patient and that of the society in which 
he lives.  The patient’s interest consists of his right to self-determination – his right to live his own life how he 
wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature death.  Society’s interest is in upholding the 
concept that all human life is sacred and that it should be preserved if at all possible.  It is well established that 
in the ultimate the right of the individual is paramount. 
 
                                                 
36 Ibid 105 (Lord Donaldson MR), 120 (Butler-Sloss LJ). 
37 475 NW 2d 426 (1991). 
38 Ibid 430 (Neef PJ). 
39 [1993] AC 789, 864. These comments were referred to in Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] FLR 129, 
133-134 (Hughes J) and HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, 416 (Munby J). 
40 [1993] Fam 95. 
41 Ibid 112.   
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A consistent position was taken by Martin CJ in the recent decision of the Western Australian 
Supreme Court in Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter.42  The case involved a quadriplegic 
man who wished to stop receiving artificial hydration and nutrition through a percutanous 
endoscopic gastrostomy tube.  In deciding that it would be lawful for the man’s residential care 
facility to act on his instructions, Martin CJ observed that the right of autonomy or self-
determination was ‘well established at common law’.43  His Honour continued that the right ‘of 
every human being of adult years and sound mind … to determine what shall be done with his own 
body’ formed part of the right of autonomy.44   
 
This position has also been adopted in cases involving advance directives, both in the United 
Kingdom and, more recently, in Australia. In W Healthcare NHS Trust v H,45 the above comments 
of Lord Donaldson were endorsed and Brooke LJ explained why the ‘important principle of 
personal autonomy’ underpinned the right to refuse treatment in advance.46 Similarly in HE v 
Hospital NHS Trust,47 Munby J also endorsed Lord Donaldson’s comments48 and described 
advance directives as ‘the embodiment of the patient’s autonomy and his right of self-
determination’.49 
 
In the recent case of Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A,50 the New South Wales 
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a refusal of dialysis that was contained in a 
document completed a year earlier should be followed.  At the time the matter was heard by the 
Court, dialysis was necessary to keep the individual alive.  McDougall J considered the ‘relevant 
but in some cases conflicting interests’51 of ‘a competent adult’s right of autonomy or self-
determination’52 and ‘the interest of the State in protecting and preserving the lives and health of its 
citizens’.53  After reviewing how these competing principles had been considered in the case law in 
England, the United States and Canada, his Honour concluded that the principle of autonomy 
should prevail over the principle of sanctity of life.54  Because the Court considered the document to 
constitute a valid refusal of treatment, it held that it should be followed. 
 
These extracts reflect the very strong and clear judicial support for autonomy being the basis upon 
which the common law recognises advance directives.   
 
                                                 
42 [2009] WASC 229. 
43 Ibid [24]. 
44 Ibid, quoting Justice Cardozo in Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 211 NY 125 (1914), 129.  The right of a 
competent adult to refuse nutrition was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory 
in Australian Capital Territory v JT [2009] ACTSC 105, [25]-[26].  In this case, however, the Court held that the adult 
who was refusing nutrition lacked capacity to make that decision. 
45 [2005] 1 WLR 834. 
46 Ibid 838 (Brooke LJ), with whom Clarke and Maurice Kay LJJ agreed (842). 
47 [2003] 2 FLR 408. 
48 Ibid 416. 
49 Ibid 418 (original emphasis). This position was also endorsed by the Court of Appeal in R (Burke) v General Medical 
Council [2006] QB 273, 296 (Lord Phillips MR, Waller and Wall LJJ). 
50 (2009) 74 NSWLR 88. 
51 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, [5] (McDougall J). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid [17].  It is interesting to observe that McDougall J had some reservations in accepting that the two principles 
were necessarily in conflict.  His Honour did not necessarily accept that society’s interest in the preservation of life 
could be taken into account without recognising that, in a liberal democracy, concepts of ‘life’ must incorporate the 
right of autonomy or self-determination: Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, [16]. 
8 
 
III. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND AUTONOMY UNDER STATUTE 
 
A. The Australian legislation 
 
Advance directive legislation which has been enacted in six of the eight Australian jurisdictions has 
enshrined the common law right to refuse medical treatment.  Depending on the nature of the 
particular statutory scheme, a person may refuse treatment by giving an ‘anticipatory direction’,55 or 
making an ‘advance health directive’,56 a ‘refusal of treatment certificate’,57 a ‘health direction’,58 
or a ‘direction’.59  Such ‘advance directions’60 will operate at a future time when the person lacks 
capacity and, depending on the circumstances of the case, may be effective to refuse medical 
treatment.   
 
In all of these jurisdictions, the person completing the advance direction must have capacity61 and, 
in most jurisdictions, he or she must not have completed the advance direction as the result of some 
vitiating factor.62 Generally, an advance direction must be made in writing,63 frequently in a 
prescribed form,64 and must comply with formality requirements regarding signature65 and 
witnessing.66 An additional requirement exists in Victoria, and the person completing the refusal of 
treatment certificate must first have received information about his or her condition.67 
 
Many of the legislative regimes differ from the common law in another important respect.  There 
are sometimes restrictions imposed on when an advance direction that refuses treatment can be 
given, or when the direction can operate.  In Victoria, treatment can only be refused through a 
refusal of treatment certificate if it relates to a ‘current condition’.68  This means that a person must 
                                                 
55 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7.  
56 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110P; Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 35.  
57 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5. 
58 Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 7. 
59 Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4.  
60 For the purpose of this section of the article, the term ‘advance direction’ will be used to refer to statutory directives 
under the various statutes, unless the context requires the use of an alternative term. 
61 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 
(WA) s 110P; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(d); Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 
7(3); Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(1); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 42. 
62 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110R; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(b); Medical 
Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 20; Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 3 para (b) of the definition 
of ‘capacity’.   
63 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 
(WA) s 110Q(1)(a); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(2); Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(1); Powers of Attorney 
Act 1988 (Qld), s 44(2).  Compare the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory which allows a direction to be 
either in writing or oral: Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 7(2). 
64 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 
(WA) s 110Q(1)(a); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(2); Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(1).  If the direction 
made pursuant to the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory is in writing, it must be in the prescribed form: 
Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) ss 7(2) and 8 (Approved Form 2007 No 55).  In Queensland, 
although a form is prescribed for the purpose of the legislation, a person is not required to use the prescribed form: 
Powers of Attorney Act 1988 (Qld), s 44(2). 
65 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2) and Consent to Medical Treatment and 
Palliative Care Regulations 2004 (SA) sch 1; Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110Q(1)(c); Medical 
Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(2) and sch 1; Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 8(a); Natural 
Death Act 1989 (NT) and Natural Death Regulations 1989 (NT) sch; Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3)(a). 
66 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1)(2)(b) and Consent to Medical Treatment and 
Palliative Care Regulations 2004 (SA) sch 1; Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110Q(1)(d) and (e); 
Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1); Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 8(c); Natural 
Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(2); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3), (4) and (6). 
67 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(b). 
68 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1). 
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be suffering from a medical condition before he or she can complete the certificate.  Further, in 
South Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland, the advance direction that refuses 
treatment can only operate if the person is sufficiently ill.  In the Northern Territory, a direction can 
only operate if the person is suffering from a terminal illness,69 while in South Australia, the person 
must be in the terminal phase of a terminal illness or in a persistent vegetative state.70  The 
restrictions in Queensland are even more extensive and an advance health directive will only 
operate if the person has a terminal illness and the person is expected to die within a year, is in a 
persistent vegetative state, is permanently unconscious, or has an illness or injury of such severity 
that there is no reasonable prospect that he or she will recover to the extent that life-sustaining 
measures will not be needed.71 
 
As at common law, a statutory advance direction must be applicable to the situation that has arisen.  
It will therefore not operate if the person has later evinced an intention not to be bound by it.  The 
statutes recognise a number of situations in which this can occur: when the person intends to revoke 
the directive but has not yet done so, or has changed his or her mind about the direction;72 the 
circumstances have changed since the directive was made;73 or the advance health directive is 
uncertain.74 
 
One final observation should be made about a provision in the Queensland legislation which is 
somewhat unique in the Australian legislative framework.  A health professional is excused from 
following an advance health directive if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that a directive 
is inconsistent with good medical practice.75  
 
 
B. Autonomy underpinning statutory recognition of advance directives 
 
As is the case with the common law, it is argued that the statutory recognition of advance directions 
in the Australian statutes is underpinned by an acceptance of the principle of autonomy.  Although 
it has been observed that some legislative provisions accord autonomy less weight,76 the statutes 
                                                 
69 Natural Death Act 1988 (NT), s 4(1).   
70 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1)(a). 
71 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s 36(2)(a).  In addition to this requirement about the person’s health, the advance 
health directive cannot operate unless the person has no reasonable prospect of regaining the capacity needed to make 
decisions about his or her health (s 36(2)(c)).  Further, if the treatment being refused is artificial nutrition and hydration, 
the commencement or continuation of that treatment must, in the circumstances, be contrary to good medical practice (s 
36(2)(b)). 
72 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(3); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 
(WA) s 110S(6); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 7(1); Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) ss 
10(1) and 12; Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(3)(a). 
73 As described above, in South Australia, the Northern Territory, Queensland and Victoria, the advance direction will 
only apply if the person has a condition or illness as set out in the various statutes.  If the person no longer suffers from 
the condition or illness, therefore, the advance direction will not apply. In addition, in Western Australia and 
Queensland, the legislation specifically provides for the advance health directive not to apply if circumstances have 
changed, and this would have caused a reasonable person to have changed his or her mind (Western Australia: 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110S(3)), or would have caused a medical professional to believe 
that the terms of the directive are inappropriate (Queensland: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103). 
74 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103.  For a consideration of the situation in the other statutory jurisdictions if the 
advance direction is ambiguous or uncertain, see Willmott, White and Howard, n 17 at 233. 
75 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103.  The term ‘good medical practice’ is defined by having regard to the 
recognised medical standards, practices and procedures of the medical profession in Australia, and the recognised 
ethical standards of the medical profession in Australia: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), sch 2 s 5B. 
76 See, for example, Willmott, White and Howard, n 17; L Willmott, ‘Advance Directives to Withhold Life-Sustaining 
Medical Treatment: Eroding autonomy through statutory reform’ (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 287; L 
Willmott, ‘Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: a Comparative Australian Statutory Analysis’ (2010) 
17 Journal of Law and Medicine 556. 
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broadly purport to give effect to the common law.  For example, when the Medical Treatment and 
Palliative Care Bill 1995 (SA) was introduced into Parliament, the Hon SJ Baker commented that 
the legislation “confirms the common law right to refuse treatment”.77 Similar comments were 
made in other jurisdictions when introducing the Bills into Parliament.78  If the primacy of 
autonomy is recognised in the common law, then the enactment into statute of those common law 
principles also accepts, at least implicitly, the appropriateness of autonomy as underpinning 
advance decisions.   
 
IV. AUTONOMY JUSTIFIES LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
 
Having established that autonomy is the basis upon which advance directives are recognised as a 
matter of law, this section of the article makes some observations about why this reliance on 
autonomy is appropriate from a theoretical perspective. We explore three arguments in support of 
this position: the necessity of autonomy in a liberal democracy, the primacy of autonomy in medical 
ethics, and the role of autonomy in contemporaneous refusals of medical treatment. 
 
A. The necessity of autonomy in a liberal democracy 
 
Liberal democracies, liberty and autonomy 
 
While it is impossible to define and has many manifestations, ‘liberal’ thought is the most 
influential ideology underpinning law and social policy in modern Western liberal democracies. 
The central motivation of liberal thought is the idea of individual liberty: that the individual should 
be free to formulate and pursue their own ends, and that in this pursuit the individual should be free 
from unjustified interference by the State and others. Liberal thought therefore places the individual 
at the centre of society, prioritising individual liberty and rights wherever possible. In 1859, John 
Stuart Mill captured the core element of liberty in liberal thought, and both the rightful and 
unwarranted exercise of State or other power in interfering with individual liberty. Mill declared 
that:79  
 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number is self-protection…the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  
 
Mill’s statement then continued to articulate the idea of autonomy, a closely related and equally 
necessary element in liberal thought. ‘In the part [of a person’s conduct] which merely concerns 
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign.’80 This injunction encapsulates the idea of autonomy: the right of self-
government.81 As with liberty, the preference given to autonomy does not mean that it is treated as 
an absolute value that can never be overridden, but it does mean that where possible it will be 
preferred. Some public health measures, such as the mandatory screening of individuals where there 
are concerns involving infectious disease, exemplify a situation where an overriding public good 
outweighs an individual’s autonomy.   
 
These notions of liberty and autonomy are closely related, and are also connected to the concept of 
individual rights. Conceptualised simply, rights can be viewed as rights to some things that are 
                                                 
77 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 3 November 1994, 990 (Stephen Baker). 
78 For a review of relevant parliamentary debates in the statutory jurisdictions, see Willmott, ‘Advance Directives and 
the Promotion of Autonomy: a Comparative Australian Statutory Analysis’, n 76 at 559-561. 
79 J S Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974) 68-69. 
80 Ibid 69. 
81 From the Greek roots autos (self) and nomos (law): Judy Pearsall (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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deemed desirable in the liberal worldview (what may be called positive liberty), and rights against 
some things seen as undesirable (negative liberty).82  Positive liberty includes the rights to life, 
liberty and security of the person, the right to equality, the right of participation in society, and the 
rights to freedom of speech, movement, thought, conscience and assembly. Positive liberty can be 
discerned as being a condition for a person’s autonomy, or self-rule. As Berlin conceived it, positive 
liberty is the ‘wish to be an instrument of my own, not other men’s acts of will…deciding, not 
being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon [by others as though incapable] of conceiving 
goals and policies of my own and realizing them.’83 Alongside these positive rights, there are 
negative rights, which include the rights to be free from arbitrary arrest, torture, and discrimination. 
Whereas positive liberty closely equates with autonomy, negative liberty can be seen as an even 
closer embodiment of liberty in the sense of freedom from external interference.  
 
There is no doubt that liberty and ‘autonomy’ are very similar concepts, and that a breach of a 
person’s liberty will often and even usually also involve an infringement of their autonomy. 
However, as Gerald Dworkin has pointed out, the two concepts are distinct. The clearest example of 
this is that a person may wish to be restricted in some way, for example by joining a monastic 
order,84 or by donating a body part, or, in the case of an apotemnophiliac, having a healthy limb 
amputated.85 Such a wish, if granted, would result in a practical restriction of liberty in the sense of 
a limitation on the ability to move, function or act in a certain way. But, fulfilment of this wish 
would not restrict the person’s autonomy (self-rule); rather, it would respect and secure it. For 
Dworkin, autonomy is therefore ‘a richer notion than liberty’,86 being an essential part of 
personhood because it is concerned with the individual’s ‘construction of meaning in his life’.87 
One can possess autonomy and choose for one’s liberty to be restricted or curtailed; but one cannot 
lack autonomy and possess liberty.  
 
Autonomy, rights to autonomy, and legal instruments 
 
In Sections II and III, we saw that the law has evolved to place the concept of autonomy as the 
privileged value in how law regulates a person’s ability to refuse medical treatment. In light of the 
development of liberal democracy over several centuries, the preference afforded to autonomy can 
be seen as an entirely logical and coherent approach. It would be at odds with the dominant societal 
ideology if, in the legal and social context of medical treatment, autonomy had been supplanted by a 
competing value which did not advance the goals of liberal society. 
 
Given the centrality of the rich notion of autonomy in liberal democracy, it is not surprising that 
Western liberal democracies have not only embedded autonomy within the common law and 
statute, but have also positioned it as a driving force within legal instruments containing their most 
aspirational socio-legal objectives. The concept of human rights is a core feature of liberal 
democracy, and a range of human rights are the impetus behind legislation and other human rights 
instruments at provincial, national and international levels. For some decades now, Western liberal 
democracies have manifested the concern to promote and protect the ideals of liberty and autonomy 
by enshrining rights in legislation; in this context, rights are used as tools to secure autonomy. 
Examples of the legislative protection of autonomy in the context of refusal of medical treatment 
                                                 
82 See further Isaiah Berlin’s exploration of ‘positive liberty’ and ‘negative liberty’: Four essays on Liberty (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969) 165. 
83 Ibid 131. This is also discussed in Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988) 13. 
84 Gerald Dworkin, n 83 at 18. 
85 We take this example from I Kerridge, M Lowe and C Stewart, Ethics and law for the health professions, 3rd ed 
(Sydney: The Federation Press, 2009) 84. 
86 Gerald Dworkin, n 83 at 107. 
87 Gerald Dworkin, n 83 at 110. 
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can be found in the United Kingdom, the USA, New Zealand, and Australia, and in international 
human rights instruments. In some cases, this is framed explicitly as a right to refuse medical 
treatment, which implicitly promotes autonomy; in others, autonomy is a consequence of the 
recognition of a right to personal security or privacy. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the principal human rights instrument is the European Convention on 
Human Rights.88  The relevant provision is Article 8, which provides for a right to respect for 
‘private and family life’. It has been held that ‘personal autonomy is an important principle 
underlying the interpretation’ of Article 8.89  Although subject to qualification,90 the expression of 
autonomy embedded in this right includes not only how a person lives his or her life, but also the 
way in which a person spends his or her final moments before death.91  The role of Article 8 in the 
context of refusals of medical treatment was commented on by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Pretty v United Kingdom:92 
 
In the sphere of medical treatment, the refusal to accept a particular treatment might, inevitably, lead to a fatal 
outcome, yet the imposition of medical treatment, without the consent of a mentally competent adult patient, 
would interfere with a person's physical integrity in a manner capable of engaging the rights protected under 
Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.  As recognised in domestic case-law, a person may claim to exercise a choice 
to die by declining to consent to treatment which might have the effect of prolonging his life …  
 
In the USA, the Supreme Court has recognised that the right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment is an aspect of the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.93 The Fourteenth Amendment provides for citizenship rights, including the right that ‘nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’. Under 
this due process clause, a competent person has a liberty-based interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment, and a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition.94 In addition, at state level, courts have typically identified a right to refuse treatment 
derived from the common law right to informed consent,95 or on a combination of this right to 
refuse treatment and a constitutional right to privacy.96  
 
New Zealand and two Australian States provide for autonomy in their human rights legislation 
through the explicit recognition of a right to refuse medical treatment. In New Zealand, section 11 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) includes as a civil right the right to refuse medical 
                                                 
88 The Human Rights Act 1998 grants some domestic legal recognition of those ‘rights and fundamental freedoms’ of 
the European Convention on Human Rights listed in s 1.  
89 Pretty v United Kingdom, (2002) 35 EHRR 1, 35-36.  See also R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, [2009] 3 WLR 403, 424-425 (Baroness Hale of Richmond); 427 (Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-
Heywood). 
90 European Convention on Human Rights, art 8(2).  
91 R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening), [2002] 1 AC 
800, 846 (Lord Hope of Craighead) which is referred to with approval in Pretty v United Kingdom, (2002) 35 EHRR 1, 
36-37 and R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions, [2009] 3 WLR 403, 416-417 (Lord Hope 
of Craighead).  See also R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions, [2009] 3 WLR 403, 424 
(Baroness Hale of Richmond), 427(Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood).  
92 (2002) 35 EHRR 1, 36. See also R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions, [2009] 3 WLR 
403, 424 (Baroness Hale of Richmond).  Note, however, that both decisions arose in the context of assisted suicide 
rather than refusals of medical treatment. 
93 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health , 497 US 261 (1990). The outcome in Cruzan was reached due to the 
deemed requirement of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ about the patient’s wishes, and the perceived lack of such evidence. 
See also M Gillick, “Advance Care Planning” (2004) 350;1 New England Journal of Medicine 7-8. 
94 The United States Supreme Court has also found that the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that no State shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, was not 
infringed by New York state laws which outlawed assisted suicide but which permitted patients to refuse medical 
treatment: Vacco (Attorney-General of New York) v Quill, 521 US 793 (1997). 
95 In re Storar, 52 NY 2d 363. 
96 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz, 373 Mass 728. 
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treatment.97 This is not an absolute right, but section 5 states that any legal limit on this right will be 
permissible only if it can be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.   
 
In the Australian State of Victoria, section 10(c) of the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) protects people from the imposition of medical treatment without ‘full, 
free and informed consent’. Similarly, in the Australian Capital Territory, section 10(2) of the 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) protects people from the imposition of medical treatment without 
‘free consent’. The Victorian provision has been judicially commented on as providing ‘protection 
of personal autonomy and integrity of the highest order [which addresses] the subject better than the 
comparable provisions internationally’.98  
 
There are also a number of international instruments that promote autonomy in this area. The most 
recent instrument to promote autonomy explicitly in the context of medical treatment is the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.99 Article 5 states that the autonomy of 
persons to make decisions is to be respected, and article 6 provides that any medical intervention is 
only to be performed with prior free and informed consent. Earlier international instruments also 
recognised autonomy, or rights to personal security, including the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966 (for example, articles 7 and 9)100 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948 (for example, article 3).101 More recently, in Europe, article 5 of the Council of 
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
1997102 requires free and informed consent to medical procedures. More specifically, relevant to the 
context of advance directives, article 9 provides that ‘previously expressed wishes relating to a 
medical intervention by a patient who is not, at the time of the intervention, in a state to express his 
or her wishes shall be taken into account’. 
 
Autonomy as a sound underpinning value for the law on advance directives 
 
Within Western liberal societies then, there is a broad base of support for autonomy as the 
appropriate normative framework for the context of administration of medical treatment, including 
refusal of life-sustaining treatment and advance directives. This alone informs a strong argument 
that it is appropriate that the notion of autonomy motivates the law about advance directives. It is 
not the purpose of this article to explore every possible alternative organising principle, or even to 
engage in an extended defence of autonomy against its critics, but we do seek to make some brief 
observations about the question of whether autonomy appears in general to be a normatively 
justifiable framework. In doing so, we examine the appropriateness of autonomy in this context 
from a theoretical perspective and, having regard to the fact that the law must generally be 
consistent and coherent, from a broader legal perspective.  We conclude that recognising autonomy 
as the normative framework motivating the law on advance directives produces a conclusion that it 
is, at the very least, a coherent and sound approach in these respects.  
                                                 
97 See also Firmin v Attorney-General, [2007] NZHC 50. 
98 Kracke v Mental Health Review Board, [2009] VCAT 646, [544] (Bell J). 
99 Adopted by acclamation on 19 October 2005 by the 33rd session of the General Conference of UNESCO, 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146180e.pdf>. For further discussion, see O Carter Snead, “Bioethics 
and Self-Governance: The Lessons of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights”, (2009) 34 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 204; R Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global 
Bioethics” (2009) 34 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 223. 
100 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966), entry into force generally 
(except Article 41): 23 March 1976. 
101 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948). 
102 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oveido, 4 April 1997), entry 





Theoretically, the notion of positive liberty, which as we have seen is a condition for securing 
autonomy, and particularly the right to security of the person, is at the core of the context of refusal 
of medical treatment. Imposition of medical treatment against a person’s wishes not only interferes 
with the person’s liberty, but infringes on their autonomy.103 Such intrusion is a direct infringement 
on the individual’s security of the person, hence infringing their positive liberty and their autonomy. 
 
Within the framework of a modern liberal democracy, which seeks to protect and promote the 
individual’s freedom from personal violation and the right to choose how his or her body is treated, 
it is difficult to divine how any framework other than autonomy could be appropriate in this area of 
law, both in logic and philosophical preference. In the medical context in general, the requirement 
that a patient provide informed consent to treatment, which is necessary to avoid an interference 
with liberty, is a classical embodiment of liberalism’s concern to protect and promote the 
individual’s rights and to counter unwarranted paternalism by either State or individual. The most 
prominent competing preference, of sanctity of life, is incompatible with a framework which 
elevates as the supreme value the individual’s positive liberty to personal security and autonomy. 
Preferring autonomy is logically and philosophically consistent, whereas to prefer sanctity of life 
would be illogical and inconsistent.  
 
For Gerald Dworkin, autonomy is particularly essential in the context of decisions about health care 
because one’s goals are unavoidably connected to one’s body. Decisions about medical treatment 
are not technical decisions for experts, but rather are inherently concerned with an autonomous 
patient because the patient’s body is irreplaceable, inescapable, and is the patient. These qualities 
lead Dworkin to the conclusion that ‘failure to respect my wishes concerning my body is a 
particularly insulting denial of autonomy’.104 Dworkin accepts that because the body is so 
important, then if paternalistic provision of treatment against one’s wishes will produce beneficial 
results, then that would seem to strengthen its claim to override a contrary autonomous refusal. 
However, he argues that the only exceptions to complying with patients’ autonomous decisions are 
in cases of emergency, decisions made by incompetent patients, patient waiver and therapeutic 
privilege; none of which apply to the case of advance directives.105 
 
Suppose a person who had made an advance directive in a situation where her family, relatives and 
friends, and even relevant cultural groups such as church or ethnic communities of which she was 
closely involved, were unhappy with her decision. On Mill’s conception, one who has made an 
advance directive would be entitled to do so, and no individual or collective, including the State, 
possesses a justified power in invalidating it. While the ‘harm’ concept is slippery, it would not be 
so broad as to embrace feelings of sadness or loss that the woman’s family or friends may 
experience. The act would properly be seen as self-regarding, and hence within the woman’s private 
sphere of liberty and a matter for her autonomous decision; it is not a violation in any sense of ‘a 
distinct and assignable obligation to any other person’ sufficient to take it outside the class of self-
regarding acts.106 Acts can still be self-regarding even if they cause ‘pain or loss to others’.107 Thus, 
there is no argument to prevent her decision based on it causing harm to others. For Mill, her 
family, friends and others are perfectly entitled to try and persuade her to take a different course of 
action;108 but no sufficient evil is being done to justify another actor compelling her to do otherwise. 
 
                                                 
103 See Gerald Dworkin, n 83 at 14. 
104 Ibid 113. 
105 Ibid 115-120.  
106 Mill, n 79 at 148. 
107 Ibid 163. 




The emphasis on the right to security of the person and hence autonomy is also consistent with the 
broader legal framework, demonstrating that these principles are consistent with the general law, 
and are not outliers with unsound conceptual foundations. Beyond the context of medical treatment, 
one of the most fundamental rights long recognised by the common law is the individual’s broad 
right to be free from interference with one’s body: this is the principle of personal inviolability.109 
The common law is broadly informed by, and places great weight on, the principle of autonomy.110 
This can be seen particularly clearly in the law of tort, which gives causes of action in assault, 
battery and negligence for positive infringements of bodily integrity.111   
 
A subspecies of this protection in the general law is the right to refuse medical treatment. This right 
is so robust that an expectant mother is entitled to refuse treatment when to do so jeopardises the 
life of the foetus; hence, despite a crude utilitarian calculus demonstrating the likely gain, the 
preservation of the life of an unborn child cannot be preferred to infringing the woman’s 
autonomy.112 In our context, a further extension of that application is found in the right to give in 
advance a direction that certain medical treatment not be administered to one’s body. 
 
Opposing views 
This is not to say that the liberal worldview is the only one, or that different organising principles 
would not promote different values as being appropriate to guide the law in this area. Beyond the 
framework of liberal thought, other conceptions of the good might produce a different result. In a 
society where neither law nor social policy is predicated on notions of individual liberty and 
autonomy, the preference given in theory and law to other values may lead to different outcomes. A 
hunger strike may be ended by force-feeding; life-saving treatment may be provided in a case where 
a patient is refusing only out of what others perceive to be ‘irrational fear’. Such measures may be 
justified under a society which has as its dominant philosophy, manifested in its law, a preference at 
least in some cases, to preserve life rather than adhere to the individual’s stated wishes.113  
However, in societies privileging liberalism and notions of liberty and autonomy, then autonomy 
does seem to be the appropriate normative framework in the context of advance directives.  
 
B. Autonomy in medical ethics 
Primacy of autonomy in medical ethics generally 
We argue that it is appropriate for autonomy to underpin legal recognition of advance directives 
because within the broader medical ethics discourse, autonomy is generally regarded as the 
dominant ethical principle.114 The increased emphasis on autonomy has evolved in recent decades 
                                                 
109 Cole v Turner, (1704) 6 Mod 149. See also Collins v Wilcock, [1984] 1 WLR 1172, 1177; W Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 15th ed (Abingdon: Professional Books, 1830) 120. 
110 For a very recent discussion of the influence of autonomy in developing the common law, see Stuart v Kirkland-
Veenstra, (2009) 237 CLR 215, 248-251 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
111 See KR v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd, [2003] QB 1441 and more recently the House of Lords’ decision in 
A v Hoare [2008] 1 AC 844, 851-857 (Lord Hoffman), 866 (Lord Carswell), 871 (Lord Brown), which overturns the 
previous contrary principle espoused in Stubbings v Webb, [1993] AC 498. 
112 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S, [1999] Fam 26; and see discussion in B v Responsible Medical Officer, 
Broadmoor Hospital, [2005] EWHC 1936 (Admin), [34]-[37]. 
113 Examples from Israel and India are provided in S Glick, “Unlimited Human Autonomy — A Cultural Bias?” (1997) 
336;13 New England Journal of Medicine 954-956. 
114 See, for example, C Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law 
(Oxford: Hart, 2009); Kerridge et al, n 85 at 85; H Lynch, M Mathes and N Sawicki, “Compliance with Advance 
Directives” (2008) 29 The Journal of Legal Medicine 133; J Devereux, Australian Medical Law, 3rd ed (London: 
Cavendish, 2007) 8; A Wrigley, “Personal Identity, Autonomy and Advance Statements” (2007) 24(4) Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 381; V English, R Mussell, J Sheather, A Sommerville, “Autonomy and its Limits: What Place for 
the Public Good” in S McLean (ed), n 5 at 117; R Gillon, “Ethics Needs Principles – Four Can Encompass the Rest – 
and Respect for Autonomy Should be ‘First Among Equals’” (2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 307; JK Mason, RA 
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and this is likely to have occurred in response to the medical paternalism which had earlier 
characterised the doctor/patient relationship.  Whereas in the past, doctors tended to advise patients 
about which treatment option should be selected, the more recent trend has been for patients to 
exercise greater self-determination as to treatment choices.115   
 
In addition to the principle of autonomy being important in its own right, it is also a central 
component of the ‘four-principles’ approach to medical ethics developed by Beauchamp and 
Childress.116  Under this approach, there are four principles that should guide conduct: autonomy, 
non-maleficence (doing no harm), beneficence (act of doing good), and justice (people should be 
treated fairly).117 In the abstract, no principle is regarded as being more important than the others.  
On a given set of facts, though, the ‘right’ outcome may be achieved by one principle overriding the 
others, or alternatively by balancing the different principles.  For example, where a competent adult 
seeks medical advice, he or she is not required to accept the treatment that is recommended by the 
doctor.  From an ethical perspective, there is consensus that autonomy (the patient’s choice to 
refuse treatment) prevails over beneficence (the doctor’s recommendation that medical treatment is 
required to improve the patient’s health).118 
 
It is acknowledged, however, that there are many who are critical of the primacy that autonomy has 
assumed in modern times.  For example, English and others argue that the dominance of autonomy 
is not helpful in resolving complex and controversial issues in emerging areas such as genetic 
testing and sharing of information that may arise from such testing, where issues about the health of 
others may be in direct conflict with an individual’s right to privacy.119  Further, even supporters of 
the principle of autonomy or the four-principles approach recognise its limitations.  Childress notes 
that the principle of autonomy will not always prevail.120  An example given is mandatory screening 
to manage the spread of infectious diseases.  In such cases, an individual’s right to refuse treatment 
(the principle of autonomy) may need to be overridden for the communal good.121  When 
considering the balancing of principles, Kerridge and others also postulate whether justice will, or 
should, overtake autonomy as the predominant principle in the 21st Century. They point to 
increasing concerns about health care being provided to the rich at the expense of the less affluent, 
and the increasing disparity between health care provided to those in poor and rich countries.122  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
McCall Smith and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 6-7; HT 
Engelhardt, “The Many Faces of Autonomy” (2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 283.  
115 See, for example, EJ Cassell, “Unanswered Questions: Bioethics and Human Relationships” (2007) 37(5) The 
Hastings Center Report 20; Mason, McCall Smith and Laurie, n 114 at 8-9; B Jennett, “Ethical Aspects of Life-Saving 
and Life-Sustaining Technologies” in AH Maehle and J Geyer-Kordesch (eds), Historical and Philosophical Perspectives 
on Biomedical Ethics: From Paternalism to Autonomy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) chap 6; RM Sade, “Autonomy and 
Beneficence in an Information Age” (2001) 9 Health Care Analysis 247; DJ Rothman, “The Origins and Consequence of 
Patient Autonomy” (2001) 9 Health Care Analysis 255.  
116 Beauchamp and Childress, n 4. This approach is an example of ‘principle-based’ ethics, a method of analysis which 
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117 For a discussion of these four principles, see Kerridge et al, n 85, chap 5.  
118 See, for example, Devereux, n 114 at 8.  For a more detailed examination of the principles of autonomy and 
beneficence and their interrelationship, see A Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).  Maclean comments that ‘the healthcare professional’s duty of beneficence 
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Primacy of autonomy in medical ethics about advance directives 
Autonomy is also the dominant principle in medical ethics discourse on advance directives.  If a 
competent adult’s advance directive refuses treatment (including life-sustaining treatment), then the 
principle of autonomy would support the notion that this refusal should be respected.  However, the 
principle of beneficence could also be relevant to the extent that a doctor may consider it to be in 
the person’s medical best interest to receive that treatment.  Where such conflict of principles exists, 
there is broad ethical consensus that the individual’s right of self-determination flowing from the 
principle of autonomy should prevail over the more indirect interest of the doctor in providing his or 
her perception of appropriate treatment.123 
 
While this is the prevailing view of how these ethical principles should be applied, there is not 
universal acceptance of this position.  Dresser, for example, protests the dominance of autonomy on 
the basis that, in some contexts of refusing life-sustaining treatment, it can lead to patient harm and, 
therefore, conflicts with the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.124  She argues that in 
cases where a directive forbids treatment that would relieve a person’s pain or discomfort, or would 
allow the person to continue an apparently valuable life, it should not be followed.  Dresser 
prioritises other principles over autonomy in these cases.125 
 
Writing in the context of end-of-life care generally, Burt suggests that while autonomy remains 
important, the principles guiding end-of-life care should shift away from autonomy as the central 
feature.126 He argues that the autonomy framework ‘does not fit the facts’ in this context.127  Burt’s 
hypothesis is that individuals do not want to confront and plan for the reality of their own death and, 
therefore, we should turn to an alternative framework for deciding treatment.128 
 
Despite these (and the earlier) objections raised by commentators, the prevailing view remains that 
autonomy is the dominant principle in medical ethics generally and in relation to advance 
directives. It is acknowledged that the principle of autonomy is not absolute and, in some health 
care contexts, other principles may need to prevail.  Nevertheless, autonomy remains central to any 
consideration of the medical ethics involved in an advance directive made by a competent person 
refusing treatment.  Accordingly, we argue that the law’s reliance on autonomy in grounding its 
recognition of advance directives is appropriate. 
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124 R Dresser, “Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients” (1994) 46 Rutgers Law Review 609. 
125 Dresser’s view that autonomy plays too great a role in the context of advance directives is shared by other 
commentators.  See, for example, C Jordens, M Little, I Kerridge, J McPhee, “From Advance Directives to Advance 
Care Planning: Current Legal Status, Ethical Rationales and a New Research Agenda” (2005) 35(9) Internal Medicine 
Journal 563 where the authors suggest that there are other ethical considerations that are relevant when providing 
treatment to an individual who has completed an advance directive; K Schaefer, U Eibach, D Roy, “The Advance 
Directive: An Expression of Autonomy, But Also of Care” (2002) 18 Ethics and Medicine 15 where the authors 
describe empirical research which they interpret as suggesting that it is the care of the patient rather then the patient’s 
autonomy that was (and needed to be) the centre of ethical considerations in end-of-life treatment.  See also S 
Ikonomidis and PA Singer, “Autonomy, Liberalism and Advance Care Planning” (1999) 25 Journal of Medical Ethics 
522 who justify autonomy (largely) as an appropriate theory to underpin advance care planning. 
126 RA Burt, “The End of Autonomy” (2005) Nov/Dec The Hastings Center Report S9, S9. 
127 Ibid. 
128 For other criticisms of autonomy as a framework for medical decision-making either generally or in the end-of-life 
context, see also the following: G Winzelberg, L Hanson and J Tulsky, n 5; JS Taylor, “Autonomy and Informed 
Consent: a Much Misunderstood Relationship” (2004) 38 Journal of Value Inquiry 383 where the author argues that 
patient well-being rather than patient autonomy is the pre-eminent value of medical treatment;  L Emanuel and Ezekiel 
Emanuel, “Decisions at the End of Life: Guided by Communities of Patients” (1993) 23(5) The Hastings Center Report 




C. Autonomy in contemporaneous refusals of treatment 
 
The final argument in support of autonomy as the appropriate source for legal recognition of 
advance directives is that autonomy is the basis upon which the law regards contemporaneous 
refusals of treatment as binding. The law is very clear in its acceptance that a competent adult is 
entitled to refuse medical treatment, even if it is clearly in the person’s medical best interest, and 
even if it is needed to keep the person alive.  The basis for this right is the principle of autonomy. 
As was discussed above, this principle trumps the sanctity of life in circumstances where a 
competent person refuses treatment.129  This is well illustrated in the decision of Re B (Adult: 
Refusal of Medical Treatment),130 which involved a refusal of treatment by B, a tetraplegic who was 
being kept alive by a ventilator.  In this case, B’s request to have the ventilator removed was not 
followed by medical staff over a period of time. Butler-Sloss P noted the conflict between the 
principles of autonomy and the sanctity of life and concluded that ‘the right of the competent patient 
to request cessation of treatment must prevail over the natural desire of the medical and nursing 
profession to try to keep her alive’.131 A declaration was made that the continued treatment of B was 
unlawful.   
 
The law governing the contemporaneous refusal of treatment described in the previous paragraph 
was recently endorsed as representing the common law in Australia.  The facts of Brightwater Care 
Group (Inc) v Rossiter,132 a case involving the request of Mr Rossiter, a quadriplegic, to have his 
percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube removed, were rehearsed earlier.  Declaratory relief was 
sought both by Mr Rossiter and his residential care facility about their respective entitlements and 
legal obligations.  The Western Australian Supreme Court held that Mr Rossiter was competent to 
make a decision about receiving artificial nutrition.  Accordingly, he had the right to refuse such 
treatment, although that would result in his death.133  This position was endorsed soon afterwards in 
a case involving an individual who had decided to fast.  In Australian Capital Territory v JT,134 the 
Supreme Court opined that a competent adult was entitled to refuse nutrition even if that resulted in 
his death.135  On the facts of the case, however, Higgins CJ held that the individual lacked capacity 
to make this decision. 
 
In a liberal democracy, the legal position just described is the only sustainable one to adopt.  A 
competent adult cannot be required to receive medical treatment against his or her will because, for 
example, that treatment is indicated by an objectively determined assessment of medical best 
interests.  We are unaware of any commentator who advances this as a defensible position. 
 
If the current law in relation to contemporaneous refusals is accepted, there is no principled basis 
for different law to apply simply because the refusal of treatment occurs in advance.  The 
application of the principle of autonomy remains the same – a competent adult must be able to 
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refuse treatment they do not wish to receive.  The only difference is one of timing.  We do concede 
that there are practical consequences of an advance directive that do not arise when treatment is 
refused contemporaneously, and that these issues must inform the development and design of the 
law. However, as a matter of principle, these concerns do not justify departing from an established 
legal position when the refusal is question is made in advance. 
 
V. RESPONDING TO CRITIQUES OF AUTONOMY AND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
 
A. Global objections to the appropriateness of autonomy 
 
In the previous section, we have argued why it is appropriate for the law to ground its recognition of 
advance directives in autonomy. This is not, however, a universally accepted position.  Some argue, 
from philosophical or other perspectives, that the principle of autonomy does not justify recognising 
advance directives. We begin by considering some of the global objections to the appropriateness of 
autonomy in this context and respond to those objections.  Two main themes can be drawn from the 
literature: advance directives lack of moral authority, and frameworks other than autonomy better 
meet the needs of incompetent adults. 
 
Lack of moral authority of an advance directive made by a competent adult 
Individuals who suffer from some kinds of degenerative disease or illness, such as dementia, will 
undergo changes in their personal characteristics, often to a significant degree.  For example, a 
woman who previously worked as a health professional in a large teaching hospital with no desire 
for, or interest in, leisure activities may subsequently receive enjoyment out of simple things such 
as strolling in the garden.  The illness may have, in effect, transformed her very essence. 
 
The notion that an individual’s identity can change over time is consistent with Parfit’s reductionist 
view of identity.  When considering identity, Parfit uses the concepts of psychological continuity 
and connectedness.136  If continuity or connectedness does not exist between a person at time 1 and 
the same person at time 2, the person may be regarded as a different entity.  Some commentators 
apply Parfit’s concept of identity to advance directives, and claim that there is an insufficient 
connection between the competent and incompetent adult to regard the previous directions given 
when competent as morally binding on the incompetent adult.137 
 
Take the above example of the health professional.  Assume she made a decision that she did not 
want to receive life-sustaining treatment once her decision-making capacity was lost because, as a 
competent adult, working as a health professional was of the greatest significance to her.  She did 
not want to continue to live if the only activities in which she could engage were simple leisure 
activities such as walking in the garden. But as a dementia-affected individual, she receives much 
pleasure from these kinds of activities and, in her present state, would certainly wish to receive 
treatment if it was needed to stay alive so that she could continue to enjoy them. 
 
This view posits that as the dementia affected-person is so different from the competent person, the 
latter lacks the moral authority to decide on treatment that the dementia-affected person should 
receive or not receive.  It is argued that one person should not be able to decide treatment for 
another when they have different interests, priorities and life goals. 
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It is acknowledged that an individual who has been suffering from dementia for an extended period 
of time can be a very different person from who he or she was before the illness took effect.  The 
damage to the brain can affect that person’s nature and behaviour.  That individual may receive 
pleasure in activities that were of no interest when he or she had competence. 
 
However, this is not a justification for not following the directions that have been previously 
expressed by the competent adult.  An important factor overlooked in this debate is that the 
dementia-affected person lacks decision-making ability.  The implications of this are, and should 
be, significant.  As that person lacks competence to make decisions, we, as a society, have 
mechanisms in place so that a decision can be made in some other way.  This means, for example, 
that if an incompetent adult has been suffering from pneumonia but insists on taking his or her usual 
hour walk in the garden on a cold winter’s night, it is unlikely that he or she would be permitted to 
do so.  The fact that the person believes that he or she will enjoy this activity (and, at some level, 
may enjoy it) does not mean that this view will prevail.  Instead, another decision will be made for 
him or her.  
 
The same logic must apply to medical treatment.  The view of the person with dementia will not, 
and should not, necessarily prevail.  We are of the view that if the individual made a decision 
refusing treatment while competent, that choice should be respected. In this regard, we are 
persuaded by Ronald Dworkin’s analysis of the famous and challenging situation of Margo, a 
woman with Alzheimer’s disease.138 Her illness was such that when reading a book, she appeared to 
select where she read at random and without regard to what parts of the book she has previously 
read.  Likewise, she listened to the same piece of music repeatedly and painted the same picture 
each day, apparently unaware of this repetition.  Margo was, however, very happy.  She appeared to 
derive a great deal of joy from these activities and was untroubled by her mental state.   
 
Ronald Dworkin presents the challenge of how Margo should be treated if she had executed a 
document refusing all medical treatment should she develop Alzheimer’s disease.139  His analysis 
leads to a conclusion that honours Margo’s pre-dementia advance directive, by three planks: the 
integrity view of autonomy (as the more powerful aspect of autonomy than the evidentiary view of 
autonomy);140 a perception of life as a single unified narrative; and the elevation of critical interests 
as having higher moral value — that is, the aims and hopes which provide authentic meaning to the 
individual’s life, including the person’s desire about how his or her life is to end — over simpler 
experiential interests such as Margo’s enjoyment of sensate pleasures like music, art and reading.141 
Even in the challenging situation of Margo, Dworkin’s analysis and reliance on the integrity view of 
autonomy appears to leave autonomy intact as a justifiable normative framework.142   
 
It may be important to an individual that his or her life not be extended if, for example, that person 
has lost his or her ability for high-level thinking and interaction.  For that person, the fact that he or 
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she comes to enjoy leisurely pursuits and does not seem concerned about the lack of intellectual 
activities is irrelevant.  In this context, it is difficult to sustain that a competent person, having been 
diagnosed with dementia and fully researched the disease including its potential effect on him or 
her, lacks the moral authority to make future treatment choices.  It is of fundamental importance for 
some people to plan for a time when they can no longer make decisions.  The planning may extend 
to such things as appointing someone to look after their finances, seeking a place to be cared for as 
well as the medical treatment they may want or not want.  Of all of these matters, arguably medical 
treatment they do not want to receive, which affects how they may die, is the most fundamental 
decision of all.  Decisions about such treatment should not be disregarded as soon as the anticipated 
event, decision-making incompetence, occurs. 
 
Frameworks other than autonomy are better suited to determine treatment for incompetent adults 
The autonomy framework prioritises previously expressed directions of the now incompetent adult.  
Some argue that, even leaving aside what they regard as inherent flaws in the autonomy framework, 
other models are better suited to caring for incompetent adults.  Dresser believes that a broader 
based model is required, one that considers the person’s condition and prognosis, the views of loved 
ones and the concerns of the larger community to which the person belongs.143  Drawing on her 
views that the incompetent adult is a different person as a result of the illness, she argues that 
emphasis should be placed on his or her subjective perspective, as well as an objective 
consideration of his or her welfare.  In Dresser’s view, adherence to the autonomy model results in 
a lack of compassion, care and protection of an incompetent (and therefore vulnerable) adult.  A 
broader model, based on what she describes as a ‘revised best-interest’ principle, is needed. 
 
Maclean is also concerned about the moral authority of advance directives, and therefore advocates 
another decision-making model.  While he does not reject the authority of the advance directive 
outright, Maclean advocates limits on its power.144  Those limits, he suggests, should be akin to the 
limits on the decision-making power that a parent has in relation to decisions about medical 
treatment for his or her child.  In that context, a prima facie right exists for a parent to make 
decisions for a child, but that right is subject to challenge if the decision is not in the best interests 
of the child.  Maclean applies this model to advance directives and argues that a directive given by a 
competent adult should be prima facie binding, except if following it would be inconsistent with 
that now incompetent person’s best interests. 
 
Our response 
The substance of our response is that to rely on a model other than autonomy would effectively 
result in a return to paternalism.  Under the model proposed by Dresser, an individual’s right to 
decide on treatment that is consistent with his or her own values and philosophies is compromised.  
An individual is not obliged to make an advance directive and if he or she does not, a decision-
making model based largely on that proposed by Dresser is likely to operate.  However, if a person 
has made an autonomous choice as to treatment they do not want in the future and thereby rejected 
that alternative model for decision-making, that should not be disregarded.  By not recognising 
advance directives and instead requiring all decisions to be made through this alternative regime, 
decisions that a person has specifically sought to avoid through their directive may be imposed 
upon them.   
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Similar criticisms of paternalism can be made of Maclean’s argument.  While purporting to accept 
the authority of advance directives, that acceptance is conditional upon the directive being in the 
best interests of the person.  It is argued that this deprives advance directives of their utility in the 
circumstances in which they are most likely to be needed, namely where a person’s particular views 
about how they wish to live their life may not coincide with societal (or medical) notions of what is 
in their best interests.  A failure to give effect to an autonomous decision simply because it does not 
accord with more objective notions of a person’s well-being cannot be sustained. 
 
 
B. Specific or practical objections to the application of autonomy to advance directives 
 
Having considered some global concerns about the appropriateness of autonomy in justifying 
advance directives, we turn now to examine specific or practical objections that have been raised 
about the utility of autonomy in this context. 
 
Lack of information on which to base an advance directive 
A common concern raised about following an advance directive is that the decision may not be an 
informed one, and therefore does not represent the autonomous choice of the person who is refusing 
treatment.145  This is particularly likely to be so where an advance directive is given before a person 
suffers from the condition or illness for which a treatment decision ultimately needs to be made.  
The onset of dementia is often given to illustrate this concern.   
 
Consider the following example: Angela, while well and before being diagnosed with dementia, 
completes an advance directive refusing any form of life-sustaining medical treatment should she be 
diagnosed with dementia and then later lose competence.  She now has dementia and is unable to 
make her own health care decisions.  However, she still leads a very active life and has considerable 
contact with her family, which she enjoys.   Angela becomes ill and a decision needs to be made 
whether to treat her with antibiotics to control an infection that is threatening her life. 
 
The concern is that her refusal in the advance directive may have been made without any 
understanding of the complexity of dementia, the different ways it can affect people, the different 
stages of deterioration, and the different treatment pathways. In the above case, for example, a 
course of antibiotics may quickly control Angela’s infection and allow her to continue living for 
many years in good physical health.  Angela may not have had this scenario in mind when she made 
an advance directive refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.  She may have (wrongly in her 
case) assumed that by the time her decision-making competence was lost, she would be unable to 
receive any enjoyment out of life, and would rather not continue living. 
 
Our response 
This argument for not adhering to the prior advance directive is persuasive and perhaps shared by 
some members of the general public.  It is clearly desirable that decisions about medical treatment 
should be informed ones.  However, the issue is not whether this is desirable but whether the 
objection is sufficient to preclude the recognition of advance directives as a means for making 
decisions about medical treatment.  We do not consider this objection sufficient for two reasons. 
 
The first is that the likelihood that some people may not take steps to ensure their decision is an 
informed one is not sufficient to deprive others of an ability to make an autonomous decision to 
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refuse medical treatment.  For the reasons discussed above, liberal societies do not displace such 
rights lightly, particularly when to do so would result in unauthorised interference with a person’s 
bodily integrity. 
 
The second reason is that to accept this objection would lead to an unjustified inconsistency with 
the law in relation to a competent adult contemporaneously refusing treatment.  For example, a 
person diagnosed with terminal cancer may choose not to receive chemotherapy or other treatment.  
That refusal is not conditional upon the patient receiving advice or information about the likely 
progression of the cancer if treated or untreated, or of the various treatment options. There is no 
principled basis for imposing additional requirements on a competent person refusing treatment 
simply because they are doing so in advance.   
 
Instability of treatment choice 
A number of commentators are also concerned that a decision recorded in an advance directive, and 
possibly made when a person is well, may not reflect the same person’s treatment choice at a later 
time.146  Accordingly, the earlier direction could not be regarded as the autonomous choice of the 
individual at that later stage.  There may be a number of reasons for a person’s change of treatment 
choice.  His or her view about treatment may simply evolve through personal experience and 
maturity.  Some also suggest that a person’s treatment choice is likely to change when he or she 
becomes ill and is closer to death.147  Even in cases where death is not imminent, a person may have 
successfully adjusted to the illness and no longer wish to refuse treatment should the need for it 
arise.  In a similar vein, others suggest that a person’s treatment setting may affect choices.  There is 
empirical evidence that people who are hospitalised are more likely to opt for medical intervention 
than those in the community.148  So, once hospitalised, a person who has earlier made an advance 
directive refusing treatment, may now want to receive medical intervention. 
 
This apparent inability to predict treatment choices accurately, it is argued, undermines the integrity 
of advance directives.  It is difficult for doctors to have confidence that an advance directive made 
at an earlier time, possibly in a different context, and perhaps when the person was well, still 
reflects a current treatment choice. 
 
Our response 
There are a number of responses to these concerns.  First, in a number of the contexts postulated 
above, the person is likely to have retained decision-making competence.  As such, their current 
views rather than previously expressed instructions in an advance directive will govern treatment.  
Secondly, even if the person no longer has the ability to make decisions about health care, the 
advance directive will not govern treatment if the circumstances, including the altered views 
expressed by the person when he or she still had competence, indicate that the person would no 
longer intend to be bound by the prior refusal of treatment.149  Thirdly, if the views of the person 
only changed after his or her decision-making capacity was lost, it is not appropriate for reasons 
already discussed150 for the views of the incompetent adult to govern treatment.   
 
The more challenging issue for those supporting the integrity of advance directives, arises where a 
person might have made different treatment choices in an advance directive had he or she 
                                                 
146 Dresser, n 145; Ryan, n 145; Dresser, n 137. 
147 Ryan, n 145. 
148 P Ditto, J Jacobson, W Smucker, J Danks, A Fagerlin, “Context Changes Choices: a Prospective Study of the Effects 
of Hospitalization on Life-Sustaining Treatment Preferences” (2006) 166 Archives of Internal Medicine 890; M Danis, J 
Garrett, R Harris, DL Patrick, “Stability of Choices about Life-Sustaining Treatments” (1994) 120 Annals of Internal 
Medicine 567. 
149 See above at Sections II(B) and III(A).  
150 See above at Section V(A). Compare Herring, n 142 and Herring, n 144. 
24 
 
experienced ill-health at the time of making it, but there is now an inability to change those 
instructions due to a lack of competence.  It is conceivable that such a ‘lived experience’, if it 
occurred before making the advance directive, would have resulted in acceptance rather than refusal 
of treatment.   
 
Our response to this objection is that in a liberal democracy, a person should not be prevented from 
making a bad decision.151  As reflected in the words of Lord Donaldson MR, provided a person is 
competent at the relevant time, the ‘right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might 
regard as sensible’.152  Making any decision in advance of it arising carries with it a risk that it will 
not be appropriate for the circumstances that eventuate.  This is a risk that autonomous individuals 
accept when choosing to make an advance directive.153  Those concerned about this possibility need 
not make an advance directive and could instead provide guidelines or preferences to support others 
making the decision of their behalf when the time comes.  The risk that treatment preferences will 
change over time (a risk which is assumed by those making an advance directive) is not sufficient to 
displace the right to make an autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment.   
 
Advance directive is not a true reflection of a person’s wishes  
Critics of advance directives argue that the recorded directive may not necessarily reflect the views 
of the person, and point to empirical evidence to support this claim.  Dresser relies on one study 
which indicates that two-thirds of those who completed an advance directive about whether they 
wanted to receive dialysis if they developed Alzeimer’s disease, wanted family and friends to retain 
some discretion about treatment, despite the directive they had given.154  Fagerlin and Schneider 
refer to a significant body of evidence that suggests that the responses a person gives will be shaped 
by the way the questions are asked.155  In the context of advance directives, these authors contend 
that a person may give a different directive depending on how the question about treatment is 
conveyed (in a negative or positive light) or how the treatment is described.  Similarly, people 
sometimes insert inconsistent statements into an advance directive.  Clearly one of these statements 
could not represent the person’s view.156 
 
If an advance directive does not truly represent a person’s wishes about treatment, it is argued that 
the directive cannot be regarded as promoting or advancing that person’s autonomous choice. 
 
Our response 
The empirical research referred to above reveals some worrying data.  It is concerning that a 
percentage of individuals who draft advance directives refusing treatment do so with some 
unarticulated qualifications about that refusal in mind.  However, what is also clear from that same 
research, is that some individuals do complete advance directives in the expectation that their 
directive will be followed closely.  It would be wrong, in principle, to deprive those people of the 
opportunity to refuse treatment in advance because others are less responsible with their 
                                                 
151 Luttrell and Sommerville express similar views, commenting that respect for autonomy requires adults to be able to 
make risky decisions: S Luttrell, A Sommerville, “Limiting Risks by Curtailing Rights: a Response to Dr Ryan” (1996) 
22 Journal of Medical Ethics 100. 
152 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [1993] Fam 95, 102. 
153 Compare the practical response from Ryan who shares the concerns about instability of choice.  He advocates that 
legislation governing advance directives should require the person to be informed that patient decisions are likely to 
change over time: Ryan, n 145. 
154 Dresser, n 145.   
155 Fagerlin and Schneider, n 145. 
156 Dresser, for example, refers to research where 10 out of 29 people agreed to inconsistent statements being included 
in their advance directive.  The first statement was that the person would never want to be on a respirator in an 
intensive care unit.  The second statement was that the person would want to receive extreme intensive medical care for 
a short period if it could return the person to near-normal condition: Dresser, n 137, referring to L Forrow, E Gogel, E 
Thomas, “Advance Directives for Medical Care” (letter) (1991) 325 New England Journal for Medical Care 1255. 
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instructions.  The preferable approach is not to deprive competent adults the right to decide their 
future treatment, but to address these concerns through education or the creation of legislative 
safeguards so that those who complete advance directives have a better understanding of their 
effect.   
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider measures that could achieve this outcome.  
However, possible strategies could include warnings in the document itself that advance directives 
will bind health professionals, family and friends in relation to treatment, combined with a 
legislative requirement that a directive be completed in consultation with a doctor.157  These steps 
would instil greater confidence that the advance directive reflects a person’s true wishes, and that 
complying with such a directive would be giving effect to that person’s autonomous choice. 
 
Advance directives rarely provide doctors with meaningful information  
Opponents of advance directives frequently criticise the quality of the instructions conveyed by 
them.  Concerns have been raised about the difficulty in articulating with sufficient clarity the kind 
of treatment a person wants to receive or refuse.  Fagerlin and Schneider, for example, observe that 
many adults are ‘functionally illiterate, and most of the literate cannot express themselves in 
writing’.158  Standard forms that facilitate completing advance directives have been developed, no 
doubt to assist people in this difficult process.  However, these forms have also been criticised both 
as being too general or superficial and, at the same time, too narrow, so that meaningful information 
about treatment is not conveyed to doctors.159 
 
Our response 
These issues, while practically relevant and should be addressed, do not raise philosophical 
concerns about the desirability of advance directives and the appropriateness of relying on 
autonomy to respect these choices.  Under existing legal principles, a doctor is not at risk for not 
following an advance directive that is unclear or uncertain.160  In other words, opponents of advance 
directives who object to their use for this reason need not be concerned as a directive that does not 
convey meaningful information will not determine treatment decisions.   
 
Even if it is thought that this objection might have some merit, the point made earlier on a number 
of occasions about a liberal society also applies here.  Denying a person the ability to determine his 
or her future treatment simply because others may give directives that lack clear guidance is 
unsustainable.  To do so would be an unprincipled interference with a competent adult’s 




Both common law and statute recognise that a person may make an advance directive refusing 
medical treatment, even if that would result in the person’s death.  Underpinning this right to refuse 
treatment is autonomy.  We have sought to argue in this article that this position is appropriate, 
desirable and defensible.  
 
                                                 
157 See for example, Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Bioethics: Advance Care Directives, LRC CP 51 (2008), 
which provisionally recommends that consultation with a medical professional should be encouraged when making an 
advance directive, and be mandatory if the directive is refusing life-sustaining medical treatment: 73. 
158 Fagerlin and Schneider, n 145 at 34.; A Holt, A Vedig, “Do Advance Care Directives Improve Acute Care Services 
for Older People?” (2006) 185(7) Medical Journal of Australia 406; S Hickman, B Hammes, A Moss, S Tolle, “Hope 
for the Future: Achieving the Original Intent of Advance Directives” (2005) Nov/Dec The Hastings Center Report 
S26A. 
159 Dresser, n 145; Dresser, n 137. 
160 See above at Sections II(B) and III(A). 
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We suggested that the acceptance of autonomy as an appropriate normative framework for such 
decisions is clearly justifiable in a liberal democracy.  Further, the dominant role of autonomy in 
medical ethics generally, and specifically in relation to advance directives, lends further weight to 
the current position.  Finally, we argued that the clear endorsement of autonomy in cases involving 
contemporaneous refusals of medical treatment favours acceptance of this principle when making 
these same decisions in advance. 
 
We also examined the views of those who argue against recognising autonomy as an appropriate 
normative framework to govern advance directives.  Some objections raised were global ones, for 
example, suggesting that other models were better suited to decision-making in this context.  
However, those objections, in turn, raise further problems such as allowing for a return to medical 
paternalism.  Other objections were more practical in nature, but again many of the difficulties that 
were claimed to exist could be addressed through education or legislative adjustment.  Although 
acknowledging these contrary views, we conclude that autonomy remains an appropriate and 
defensible normative framework to underpin the law governing advance directives. 
 
 
